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I. Introduction
In recent years, scholars have questioned the shifting foundation of communication 
policy making in Europe. The changing technologies of communication significantly in-
fluenced the developments in the field of media policy, accounting for structural varia-
tions in the activities performed by regulatory institutions. Three paradigmatic phases 
of communications and media policy may be distinguished (Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003): 
the paradigm of emerging communications industry policy (until the Second World War); 
the paradigm of public service media policy (1945–1980/90); and the current phase 
(from 1980/90 onwards) in which a new policy paradigm is searched for. 
Political shifts and institutional changes reflect upon the dynamics of the policy proc-
ess. While these changes are relatively easy to detect and investigate, shifts in the fun-
damental principles of media policy are more difficult to discern (Nieminen, 2009). The 
constantly developing technologies and its impact on the policy making process have 
drawn the attention on “new tensions between interests and values”. Nieminen (2009) 
argues that “much of the discussion on various media policy issues (...) are today framed 
in terms of a tension between democratic and cultural values and economic or industrial 
objectives. Practical policy decisions and policy coordination, both on the EU level and 
on the national level, have to be made in this contested terrain where diverse forces are 
pulling the policy makers to different directions”.
Following this line, this research addresses the above mentioned tensions between dif-
ferent approaches on media and political systems to operationalize main concepts re-
garding regulatory policies (e.g. de jure and de facto autonomy of NRAs). 
1 Author‘s note: A preliminary draft of this research has been published with refereed Communication Spanish Journal 
Trípodos (2013). Please do not copy, quote or cite without permission. E-mail: adriana.mutu@uab.cat. 
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The emergence of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) for regulating broadcasting 
has stimulated the academic debate on the causal links between the institutional design 
and the regulatory outcomes. Political communication scholars have questioned “whether 
democracy is automatically supported when freedom of broadcasting is guaranteed or 
whether, instead, additional assurances are necessary” (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996). The tradi-
tional hypothesis that higher levels of democracy also infer higher levels of media freedom 
has not yet been demonstrated convincingly, although this assumption accounts as a basis 
for understanding the relationship between media and political systems (Hanretty & Koop, 
2012). Exploring the contrasts between media systems and the division of political power 
in democratic or authoritarian nations creates the premises for a comparative perspective 
on the interrelations between media and politics. 
In this regard, this study seeks to build on Lijphart´s (1999) and Hallin & Mancini´s 
(2004) typologies of democracy and media systems a broader classification of NRAs in 
47 European countries. My primary research focus is to measure the potential for auton-
omy of NRAs, testing two indicators: appointment of heads and budget frames. I debate 
whether the patterns of Hallin and Mancini´s (2004) ideal media systems can be ob-
served when studying the institutional design of broadcasting regulators in democratic 
contexts. I address the question of institutional similarities or contrasting cases of NRAs 
across Europe and explore how the proposed variables can be evaluated according to Li-
jphart’s dimensions of democracy. The connection between NRAs and political systems 
is narrowly postulated in the literature. There is no systematic comparative approach on 
broadcasting regulation in Lijphart´s (1999) and Hallin and Mancini´s (2004) axiomatic 
perspectives on democracy and media systems. Therefore, the innovative groundwork of 
this contribution might have a strong impact, filling the existing theoretical and empiri-
cal gap in the communication scholarship.
This research project is structured as follows. First, it gives a brief overview of the re-
cent contribution to the core of broadcast regulatory philosophy, arguing that compara-
tive research on media and political systems provides little systematic theoretical and 
empirical evidence to support the links between institutional arrangements and types of 
democratic regimes. Secondly, Lijphart´s (1999) and Hallin & Mancini´s (2004) theories 
are summarized and the innovation of this research is argued. The subsequent section 
discusses systematically the relationship between media and political systems, focus-
ing on a set of characteristics of democracy in Lijphart’s (1999) terms to examine the 
effects of legislative provisions (such as appointment of heads and means of funding) on 
the autonomy of NRAs. I describe in details three variables (the independence of Central 
Banks, Proportional (PR) and Veto Players) to justify the connection among the insti-
tutional design of NRAs in different media and political systems across Europe. I rate 
the Polarized Pluralist media model (majoritarian democracies) with a lower degree of 
institutional autonomy of NRAs due to the appointment procedures and budget frames. I 
estimate a higher rating of institutional autonomy in consensus Democratic Corporatist 
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and Liberal countries due to the appointment procedures and budget frames. Finally, in 
the last part of this study, I review the potential configuration of the macro-analytical 
framework of broadcasting regulators. 
II. Literature review 
Comparative research on media and political systems provides little systematic theo-
retical and empirical evidence to support the links between institutional arrangements 
and types of democratic regimes. The research to date has tended to focus on particular 
and specific national cases rather than cross-country comparative studies. Communi-
cation scholarship and public policy are “weakly connected” (Neuman, 2003). Although 
the literature on regulation is immense, the number of studies dealing with the political 
aspects of regulation is very limited. There is no systematic cross-country comparative 
approach on NRAs compressed into one structural study, but several involving singular 
cases of regulatory authorities. Evaluating peculiar paradigms “can provide a basis for 
accounting specific patterns, but lacks on presenting the consequences and outcomes 
of large-scale transformations” (Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). Systematic comparative 
research in a cross-national perspective can contribute with an encompassing panorama 
of the interrelations between media and political systems. 
In recent years, scholars have analyzed the various models of broadcasting regulation 
testing criteria such as the means of ownership, control, financing, extent of services, 
programming policy. Some of the key questions in the literature can be summarized as 
follows: the main functions of broadcasting regulators (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996); the role 
carried out by ministries; the degree of independence and the extent of the autonomy 
of regulators affected by their dependence on the Government or Parliament (Verhoest 
et al, 2004a, 2005b; Magetti, 2007; Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 1968; Walzer, 1983; Hills, 
1986, 1991; Newberg, P, 1989a, 1989b). American researchers have classified broad-
casting regulators examining some of the indicators mentioned earlier (ownership, con-
trol and financing). They explored areas such as history, economics in business, adver-
tising, law and social aspects of regulation (Finn & Chester, 1978; Fedler, 1978; Head & 
Sterling, 1982). 
By way of illustration, Bittner (1980) describes the attributes of the Federal Commu-
nication Commission (FCC), pointing out that controlling broadcasting “extends beyond 
government owned media (...) including privately owned broadcast media”. Bittner (1980) 
found that ownership may be by the Government, public corporation, private enterprise 
or hybrid arrangements (involving the state). A different theoretical approach for ana-
lyzing broadcasting is Howell´s (1986) “Four Worlds” taxonomy”, a method which helps 
describing the international relations; The First World – advanced democracies of the 
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West; the Second World – post-communist countries; the Third World – the emerging de-
mocracies in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Central and Latin America; the Fourth World 
– the stateless cultures existing within nations. Howell (1986) tests indicators such as 
ownership typologies, financial support mechanisms, dominant national models, opera-
tional autonomy and organizational structure. 
Albert Namurois (1972) reviews the world system of telecommunications, radio and TV 
services, presenting a typology of regulators based on four means of control: state-op-
erated directly by a government ministry, department or administrative agency; public 
corporation operated autonomously under state charter; public interest partnership op-
erated by legally chartered private corporations with state stock interests; private en-
terprise operated by private individuals or companies under governmental license with 
generally weak regulations. 
European scholars have examined the changing practices, structures and contents of 
communication policies mostly focusing on particular regions such as the Nordic coun-
tries (BalÐytienÐ, 2012; Lund, 2007), Western Europe (Humphreys, 1996; Kuhn & Stan-
yer, 1999; Rogers & Balle, 1985), Southern Europe (Botella Corral, 2001, 2007), Cen-
tral-Eastern Europe (Balabanova, 2007; Splichal, 1994). Kuhn and Stanyer (1999), for 
instance, discuss regulatory issues in contemporary France and Britain, bringing out the 
relation between television and the state. The authors evaluate variables as market en-
try, media ownership and television content, arguing that setting regulatory bodies dem-
onstrates “the refusal of those in power to become directly involved in the administra-
tion of the audiovisual sector”. 
Concepts such as “media ownership” and “public interest” are associated with liberal mar-
ket values by scholars describing media regulation in the Baltic zone (Nieminen, 2009). 
Balcytiene (2009) argues that none of the Baltic countries have any laws against media 
concentration, although the state plays an active role in imposing restrictions on the 
amount of political advertising in the media. Moving towards the Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), the institutional models of regulation developed after the collapse of the 
communist system in the early 1990s are recurrent in the recent literature (Gross, 2002; 
Gulyás, 1999, 2003; Mihelj & Downey, 2012). In this area, economic and social-cultural 
variables might explain the divergent approaches to ethnic and cultural diversity across 
different media systems.
Studying the direct links among different models of democracies and NRAs is still a work 
in progress. So far, in the search for general communication patterns and their conse-
quences, the investigation of institutional arrangements has been important when com-
paring systematically different media and political systems (Voltmer, 2000; Siebert 
et al, 2006; Mughan & Gunther 2000; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Snow, 1986). Preliminary 
work on institutional arrangements such as the budget frames and the appointment of 
the heads was undertaken by several scholars (Gilardi, 2001; Cukierman et al, 1992; 
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Bernhard, 1998; Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963; Stone, 1991). Warrick Smith (1997) 
classifies the regulators according to their institutional independence, dividing these 
bodies in traditional ministerial and fully independent authorities. Geradin and Petit 
(2004) list a typology of regulators according to the tasks they have to perform: imple-
mentation, observation, cooperation, yet-to-be-implemented tasks. 
Another approach has been undertaken by Emmanuelle Machet (2002). She looks at the 
appointment of heads and the funding of regulatory bodies, identifying five main models 
of appointment and three different models of funding: 
1.  Appointment by the executive: “the Northern European Model” (Anglo-Saxon and 
Scandinavian countries, which rely on unwritten traditions of non-interference by 
government);
2.  Appointment by legislative: “the Central European Model” (Slovenia, Slovakia, Bul-
garia, Estonia);
3.  Appointment by both executive and legislative: “the French Model” (France, Romania, Po-
land; this system is closely linked to the political structures of these countries);
4. Appointment by the Judiciary (Portugal, Sweden);
5.  Appointment by social movements and groups/civil society: “The German Model” 
(Germany, Belgium, Ireland).
Also, Machet (2002) presents three models of funding: through the state budget, through a 
percentage of licence fees or advertising revenue, and through a mixed system.
A more recent contribution is the INDIREG report (“Indicators for independence and ef-
ficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies for the purpose of 
enforcing the rules in the AVMS Directive” SMART 2009/0001, 2011), which identified 
indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media regulatory 
bodies. The outcome is an assessment of the level of independence and of the efficient 
functioning in five different dimensions: “status and powers”, “financial autonomy”, “au-
tonomy of decision-makers”, “knowledge” and “accountability and transparency”. The 
main objective is to give an overview on the status quo of audiovisual regulators in 43 
countries (Member States of the EU, candidate and potential candidate countries to the 
European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, USA, Australia, 
Singapore and Japan). The INDIREG report (2011) fails in the attempt to create catego-
ries of broadcasting regulators, due to “the very specific development paths of media 
regulation in different countries”. The authors argue that the project “turned out not to 
be successful, since there is no analytical necessity for regulatory settings in different 
countries to follow distinct patterns”. 
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A descriptive overview on broadcasting regulation was recently published in the collective 
e-study Media Regulators in Europe: A cross-country Comparative Analysis (Helena Sousa 
et al., 2013). The research aimed at analyzing regulatory bodies from 13 European coun-
tries: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzer-
land, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Based on a theoretical model, the authors 
compared NRAs across Europe on nine dimensions: legal framework, functions, legitimiz-
ing/ underlying values, performance, enforcement mechanisms/ accountability, institu-
tional organization/ composition, funding, regulation in context and ignored dimensions 
(such as missing critical dimensions of the model proposed by the authors). 
The study in hand aims at scaling the potential for autonomy of NRAs across Europe. The 
series of characteristics of the two indicators I test - appointment of heads and financial 
settings - are presented later in the paper.
III. Consensus and majoritarian approaches to NRAs
In this section I explain why I apply Lijphart’s (1999) and Hallin and Mancini´s (2004) 
theoretical frameworks as explanatory tools for mapping broadcasting regulators in Eu-
rope. For this purpose, I infer theoretical arguments quoted in the literature. 
The links among regulatory authorities in broadcasting and features of consensus and 
majoritarian democracy are advanced in the normative study Comparing media systems 
(2004). Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that “the differing roles the state can play as 
owner, regulator, and funder of the media are clearly rooted in more general differences 
in the role of the state in society”. When exploring and classifying media systems in 18 
nations within North America and Western Europe, Hallin and Mancini (2004) focus on 
political variables such as political history, consensus vs. majoritarian government (Li-
jphart, 1999), individual vs. organized pluralism, and rational-legal authority. As media 
variables, four dimensions were proposed: the structures of the media market, political 
parallelism, the development of journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state. 
The authors believe that these criteria cluster together into distinct types, suggesting 
a threeÐfold classification of media systems. They identify a Liberal model, which pre-
vails in AngloÐAmerican countries (Britain, the US, Canada and Ireland), characterized 
by commercial media and market mechanisms. By contrast, the Democratic Corporatist 
model, which is thought to prevail across the consensus democracies in northern Eu-
rope (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland), emphasizes the links between commercial media and organized social and 
political groups, within the context of an active but limited role of the state. Lastly, the 
Polarized Pluralist model, which they suggest typifies Mediterranean Europe (France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), integrates media into party politics, with a weaker 
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commercial media and a stronger role for the state. Hallin and Mancini conclude that, 
although the Liberal model has dominated media studies, the Polarized Pluralist model 
probably provides a more accurate description of journalism in many parts of the world.
In their normative study, Hallin and Mancini (2004) show that features of media sys-
tems correspond with the two dimensions of democracy in Lijphart’s (1999) terms: “po-
litical system characteristics are manifested more or less directly in media structures, 
as for example majoritarian or consensus patterns of government are reflected in the 
organization of public broadcasting institutions”. The authors present four basic mod-
els of governance of public broadcasting that by approximation may frame the political 
control over NRAs. In the government model public broadcasting is controlled directly 
by the government or by the political majority (Western Europe, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain). Here, directors of public broadcasting are appointed by Parliament, not directly 
by the government, “but this in the end gives the majority party effective control” (Hal-
lin & Mancini, 2004). The second model is the professional one, where a strong tradition 
developed that broadcasting should be “largely insulated from political control” and run by 
broadcasting professionals (UK, Canada, USA, Ireland, some Scandinavian countries). In 
the parliamentary or proportional representation model control over public broadcasting 
is divided among political parties by proportional representation (PR). Finally, in the civic 
or corporatist model the control of public service broadcasting is distributed among vari-
ous social and political groups (Germany, Austria and Netherlands). 
When accounting the three-fold classification based on the mentioned indicators, Hal-
lin and Mancini (2004) make an important statement: “the relationships (between the 
variables) proposed must be considered hypotheses, given the preliminary nature of this 
research”. Following these normative assessments, my project aims to fill the existing 
gap left by the limited articulations on the reflection of majoritarian and consensus pat-
terns of government over NRAs in different media systems. For this purpose, I focus on 
a set of characteristics of democracy in Lijphart’s (1999) terms to examine the effects 
of legislative provisions (such as appointment of heads and means of funding) on the 
independence of NRAs across Europe. Before describing in detail variables such as the 
independence of Central Banks, Proportional Representation (PR), and Veto Players, I 
present briefly Lijphart’s typology of modern democracy, considered to be one of the 
most “innovative contributions” in comparative politics (Mainwaring, 2001). 
The main argument for being “the single most influential” is that the patterns of consensus 
and majoritarian democracies cannot be identified beyond his original sample (Bormann, 
2010). In his book Patterns of Democracy (1999), Lijphart asks the question “who governs 
and in whose interest in cases of disagreement” and his empirical tests provide relevant 
differences between majoritarian and consensus democracy in terms of power sharing. The 
majoritarian model features a majority cabinet, a two-party system, a disproportional sys-
tem of elections, a unitary and centralized government, and unicameralism. Diametrically 
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opposed, consensus democracy tends toward power sharing, a broad coalition cabinet, 
a multi-party system, a proportional electoral system, a federal and decentralized gov-
ernment, and a strong bicameralism. Lijphart employs various indicators of the quality 
of democracy, such as voter turnout, government-voter proximity, and women’s repre-
sentation in parliament, concluding that consensus democracies are better, “kinder and 
gentler” forms of ruling than majoritarian ones (Bormann, 2010). 
The degree of consensus and majoritarian democracy is measured by ten constitutional 
features and electoral outcomes. Factor analysis on these ten indicators in 36 different 
democracies yields two dimensions. The horizontal one - the executive parties (or power 
sharing) dimension, comprises the effective number of parliamentary parties, the fre-
quency of single-party government, the average cabinet length, the degree of electoral 
disproportionality, and the interest group system. The second, vertical, federal-unitary 
dimension, consists of the degree of federalism, bicameralism, strength of judicial re-
view, constitutional rigidity, and degree of central bank independence. The indicators of 
democratic quality are positively correlated with the degree of consensus democracy on 
the horizontal, i.e. the executive-parties dimension. 
Lijphart´s findings have been largely criticized. One argument is that empirical typolo-
gies have difficulties in explaining causal regularities. Secondly, his sample excludes all 
new democracies from Eastern Europe and scholars failed in the attempt to replicate 
Lijphart’s findings for this countries. Not only do the two dimensions of democracy not 
emerge in a statistical analysis of nineteen post-communist states, but the key features 
either lose their connection or their relationship takes the opposite direction. It is diffi-
cult to apply Lijphart’s framework for the new democracies instead of established ones. 
The insights from the case study in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe confirm the difficul-
ties of applying Lijphart’s typology outside the OECD world (Bormann, 2010).
IV. Accounting the Autonomy of NRAs
The connection among the institutional design of NRAs in different media systems and 
the configuration of political systems is narrowly analyzed in the literature. The poten-
tial for autonomy of regulators has been discussed in correlation with the independence 
of Central Banks (Rogoff, 1985). This issue represents a core concept in Lijphart’s work 
on democracy, as the independence of Central Banks is highly correlated with the fed-
eral-unitary dimension (the guaranteed division of power). Lijphart (1999) argues that 
central banks play a crucial role in the policy process if they are strong and independ-
ent. In cases when central banks depend on the executive, the degree of independence 
decreases. According to Lijphart (1999), in consensus democracies central banks enjoy 
a higher rate of independence, while in majoritarian systems the potential for independ-
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ence declines: “Giving central banks independent power is yet another way of dividing 
power and fits the cluster of divided-power characteristics (the second dimension) of 
the consensus model of democracy; central banks that are subservient to the executive 
fit the concentrated-power logic of majoritarian democracy” (Lijphart, 1999). 
Central Banks independence comprises two elements (Alesina and Summers, 1993; Mag-
getti, 2007): political independence, “as the ability to select policy objectives without 
influence from the government”, and economic independence, “the ability to use instru-
ments of monetary policy without restrictions”. The distinctions between formal (de jure) 
and informal (de facto) independence of different regulatory agencies are drawn by Gi-
lardi (2001) as follows: the status of the agency head and/or management board; the re-
lationship among the agency and politicians; the budget; the competencies delegated to 
the authority. Considering Lijphart´s (1999) empirical findings on the independence of 
Central Banks and indexing indicators for potential of autonomy of NRAs looking at the 
appointment procedures and budget frames, it may be hypothesized that majoritarian 
Polarized Pluralist countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) correspond with lower ratings of 
institutional autonomy of regulators. In opposition, due to the appointment procedures 
and budget frames, I estimate a higher rating of institutional autonomy in consensus 
Democratic Corporatist and Liberal countries. I present a more detailed argumentation 
later in the Discussion section.
Proportional Representation (PR) is the second key indicator that can configure the poten-
tial for autonomy of NRAs. Proportional representation (PR) divides and distributes political 
power among different parties in proportion to the votes they receive. Proportional Repre-
sentation “is likely to be associated with multiparty systems, coalition governments (includ-
ing, in many cases, broad and inclusive coalitions), and more equal executive-legislative power 
relations” (Lijphart, 1999). In other words, consensus democracy tends toward proportional 
representation (PR), while the typical electoral system of majoritarian democracy is “the 
single-member district plurality or majority system”. I question whether the distribution of 
political power is reflected in the composition of the board members of NRAs and if PR influ-
ences the degree of financial autonomy of regulators. 
The literature on regulation mentions two types of affiliations between the public broad-
caster and the state (INDIREG, 2011). Countries such as Germany, Austria and Netherlands 
represent the proportionality model, where the influence of political parties and civil soci-
ety groups is reflected in the governance of the public broadcaster. In the insulated public 
broadcaster model independent regulators are required (the UK, Ireland and the Scandina-
vian countries). A key argument favouring PR in the board of regulators is that “the fair rep-
resentation of <socially significant groups> can guarantee a certain degree of independ-
ence from political interference, as (...) all main parties have a voice” (INDIREG, 2011). 
On the other side, there is an increasing risk of political constraints: politicians can be 
appointed in boards and “socially significant groups already have strong political alle-
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giances” (INDIREG, 2011). Preliminary estimations regarding the influence of Propor-
tional Representation (PR) on the appointment of heads and budget settings of NRAs are 
presented in the fifth part of the paper.
I analyze the potential for autonomy of NRAs in relation with the number of Veto Players 
in a polity (Hanretty, 2010). Veto Players focuses on “how many individual or collective 
actors need to agree in order to change the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2006). According to 
Lijphart (1999), the number of Veto Players and their polarisation influences the differ-
ences among presidential and parliamentary systems. In terms of regulatory issues, this 
means that the independence of NRAs in different political regimes is directly linked 
with the existence of Veto Players and influenced by the degree of ideological distance 
(Hanretty & Koop, 2012). In countries where political parties are polarised (consensus 
democracies) a higher degree of autonomy of regulators is expected, as I will emphasize 
in section V. Hanretty (2010) argues that where multiple Veto Players “need to agree, 
the match between any appointing actor and the appointed person will be looser”. Conse-
quently, in consensus democracies regulators enjoy a higher degree of autonomy due to 
the influence of Veto Players in NRAs´appointment procedures. Contrary, I rate NRAs in 
majoritarian democracies with a lower degree of autonomy due to the influence of Veto 
Players in appointment procedures. 
Following this line, the research in hand aims to test the interrelations among features 
of democratic political regimes in different media systems. At this point, I hypothesize 
a strong relationship between the degree of autonomy of NRAs and elements of consen-
sus and majoritarian democracies. I am filling the existing gap left by the limited ties 
between broadcasting regulation and political systems, exploring whether Hallin and 
Mancini’s hypotheses regarding the reflection of majoritarian or consensus patterns of 
government over broadcasting regulatory institutions can be theoretically and empiri-
cally argued.
V. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.
 In consensus democracies the potential for autonomy of the heads of NRAs increases 
due to the appointment procedure. In majoritarian democracies the potential for auton-
omy of the heads of NRAs decreases due to the appointment procedure.
It can be predicted that political control over NRAs decreases with the number of play-
ers involved. The partisanship of nomination, representation or reproduction of political 
power structures in the board composition of NRAs is more likely to mirror political ma-
jorities (INDIREG, 2011). In majoritarian political systems, appointment of the governing 
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board of NRAs by proportional representation results in control of the political majority, 
even if broadcasting regulators are formally under the authority of parliament and not 
directly supervised by the government (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
Hypothesis 2.
In consensus democracies the potential for autonomy of NRAs increases due to the 
influence of more players regarding the budget allocation. In majoritarian democra-
cies the potential for autonomy of NRAs decreases due to the influence of one single 
player regarding the budget allocation. 
It can be expected that significant changes in the budget allocation for regulators in-
dicate less institutional autonomy of heads of NRAs. A higher degree of institutional 
autonomy is expected in countries where there is a relative stability and continuity in 
allocating the budget. According to the literature consulted, political parties do not con-
strain regulatory bodies in countries where the parliament sets and approves the budget. 
Also, in countries where the budget frames is protected by legislative means, evidence 
suggests less political pressure on NRAs. In contrast, where external parties have a “le-
gal influence on the level of the budget, they can undermine its operational capacity by 
denying its adequate financing” (INDIREG, 2011).
VI. Data and Methods
I develop comparative research on broadcasting regulation across 47 European countries, 
testing two variables: appointment of heads and means of funding. I expect that the examina-
tion of various regulatory systems highlights the degree of institutional autonomy of NRAs. 
The sample selected allows newer democracies to be contrasted with older ones. I am cur-
rently constructing a database on NRAs across Europe, collecting data from different sources 
such as official documents, statutes, constitution, laws, terms of reference, rules of proce-
dures, the financial regulations. Also, this comparative study relies on a secondary evaluation 
of existing material that has already been produced in the countries in question. The evolu-
tion and the forms of broadcasting regulation across Europe is presented in a cross-national, 
cross-time, and cross-issue analysis of patterns of regulation.
To answer the proposed research questions, I triangulate different methods:
0]P[hbXb^US^Rd\T]cbP]SPRPST\XR[XcTaPcdaT*
4eP[dPcX^]^UbcPcXbcXRP[SPcP4DA>BC0C*
2a^bb½RPbTbR^\_PaXb^])[TVP[UaP\Tf^aZb]PcX^]P[aTVd[Pc^ahbcadRcdaTbP]S_^-
litical systems; 
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@dTbcX^]]PXaTbPQ^dc_^[XcXRP[P]S\TSXPT]eXa^]\T]cbX]fWXRW]PcX^]P[aTVd[Pc^ab
operate; the questionnaire will be sent to chief executives of NRAs across Europe;
8]cTaeXTfbfXcWcWTWTPS\T\QTab^U=A0bX]4da^_TPaT_aTbT]cPcXeT=A0U^aTPRW
model of media system). 
VII. Testing the Potential for Autonomy
In the recent literature on regulation, Regulatory Authorities (RAs) are presented as 
bodies which “develop and implement regulation, ranging from goal formulation, rule 
making, and standard setting, to monitoring, enforcement, adjudication, and application 
of sanctions and rewards” (Matthys et al., 2010). Scholars argue that NRAs have strong 
regulatory position and power when they take decisions on regulatory issues independ-
ently from influence from external actors, and when they are perceived by all relevant 
actors to be the most central, important, and influential actor for the regulation of the 
market at stake (Matthys et al., 2010). Power is defined as “the ability to take decisions 
that affect the choices and actions of other actors in order to reach certain goals (power 
“over” and power “to”). The hypothesis that regulatory agencies that are very autono-
mous towards government will have a stronger position and power accounts as a basis 
for understanding theoretical/normative arguments based on credibility, legitimacy, and 
administrative capacity of NRAs. 
Autonomy is defined as the ability “to translate one’s own preferences into authoritative 
actions, without external constraints” (Nordlinger, 1987). Verhoest (2004) has conceptu-
alized two kinds of autonomy: 
1.  Autonomy at the level of decision-making competencies of the agency (management 
and agency policy);
2.  Autonomy as the exemption of constraints on the actual use of decision-making com-
petencies of the agency (structural, financial, legal and interventional constraints 
on the agency’s decision-making competencies).
The distinction between de jure autonomy and de facto autonomy has been debated by 
several researchers. Formal autonomy (de jure) is “the product of laws and statutes pre-
scribing the institutional design and safeguards of a regulatory body” (INDIREG, 2011). 
Minimum requirements of formal autonomy are:
CWTPVT]RhWPbXcb^f]_^fTabP]SaTb_^]bXQX[XcXTbVXeT]d]STa_dQ[XR[Pf*
8cXb^aVP]XbPcX^]P[[hbT_PaPcTSUa^\\X]XbcaXTb*
8c]TXcWTaXbSXaTRc[hT[TRcTS]^aU^a\P[[h\P]PVTSQhT[TRcTS^UUXRXP[b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De facto autonomy is defined by Hanretty (2010) as “the degree of taking day-to-day 
decisions without receiving and acting on the basis of instructions, threats or other in-
ducement from politicians”. Threats to de facto autonomy have been discussed in the 
literature as potential external constraints for NRAs (INDIREG, 2011):
1. Legislative changes to the statutory laws of the regulator
2. The actual use of formal control opportunities by elected politicians
3. Politicization of appointments
4. Alternative compliance mechanisms
5. Revolving-door and career paths
6. Independence from regulatees and other third parties
Maggetti (2007) examines the relations between formal independence, as prescribed in 
the statutes of agencies, and de facto independence, and explains how the two types of 
independence may diverge from each other. He develops five hypotheses about varia-
tions in de facto independence, testing his theoretical expectations on 16 Western Eu-
ropean regulators, using a fuzzy-set analytical technique. First, he tests explanations 
about the de facto independence of agencies from politicians: formal independence, age, 
veto players, coordination of the economy, sectoral path dependence, and the effect of 
agencies’ networks. Then, he test hypotheses regarding the variations in de facto inde-
pendence from the regulatees. The selected cases are 16 formally independent regula-
tory authorities in 10 Western European countries and three sectors. Results show that 
“formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining the 
de facto independence of agencies, and the divergence from statutory prescriptions re-
flects a significant range of causal conditions”.
VIII. Appointment procedure
From the literature I derived the following indicators regarding the appointment proce-
dure, which outlined my first hypothesis aimed at measuring the degree of autonomy of 
the heads of NRAs (Gilardi, 2001; INDIREG, 2011; Fernandez-i-Marin, Saz-Carranza & 
Vandendriessche, 2012): 
=^\X]PcX^]Q^Sh
0__^X]c\T]cQ^Sh
0__^X]c\T]c\TRWP]Xb\
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ETc^RP_PRXch
CTa\^U^UUXRT
AT]TfPQX[Xch^U^UUXRT
3Xb\XbbP[_a^RTSdaT
4[XVXQX[Xch
8]R^\_PcXQX[XcXTb
Data is also collected on the term of office of the heads of the regulatory body (if coin-
cides or not with the election cycle), on the renewability of appointment (limited to one 
or two instances), on the partisanship of nomination, representation or reproduction of 
political power structures in board composition, the possibilities of the appointing body to 
exert pressure on the appointed member, tenures and salaries. The data collected on the 
appointment procedure may indicate the level of control over the heads, and by approxi-
mation, over the NRAs (Fernandez-i-Marin, Saz-Carranza and Vandendriessche, 2012).
The literature on regulation does not mention a unique correct model for nomination 
and appointment procedure. Across Europe there are different models of appointment 
of heads of NRAs. For instance, countries where the Executive is predominant in the ap-
pointment procedures are Austria, Ireland and Malta. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Portugal and Greece are models with a predominance of parliament. Countries like Italy, 
Spain, Romania and France are models involving both parliament and the executive in the 
nomination and appointment procedures. In some cases, such as Bulgaria, some of Ger-
man Länder, Hungary and Lithuania, civil society and relevant professional organisations 
are involved in nomination and appointment of heads of NRAs.
The following models of nominations exist (INDIREG, 2011):
1) Models with a predominance of the executive:
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWTV^eTa]\T]cP]SP__^X]c\T]cQh_aTbXST]c)0dbcaXP*
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWT\X]XbcTaP]SP__^X]c\T]cQhcWTV^eTa]\T]c)8aT[P]S*
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWT_aX\T\X]XbcTaP]ScWT^__^bXcX^]P]SP__^X]c\T]cQh_aTbXST]c)<P[cP
2) Models with a predominance of parliament: 
]^\X]PcX^]Qh_^[XcXRP[_PacXTbP]SP__^X]c\T]cQh_Pa[XP\T]c)cWT2iTRWAT_dQ[XR*
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]^\X]PcX^] Qh P _Pa[XP\T]cPah R^\\XccTT ^a Qh P \X]X\d\ ]d\QTa ^U \T\QTab ^U
parliament and appointment by parliament: Estonia, Latvia, Portugal;
]^\X]PcX^] Qh cWT _aTbXST]c ^U _Pa[XP\T]c P]S P__^X]c\T]c Qh cWT R^]UTaT]RT ^U
presidents of parliament: Greece.
3) Models involving both parliament and the executive
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWT_Pa[XP\T]cP]SP__^X]c\T]cQhcWT_aTbXST]c)8cP[h*
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWT_Pa[XP\T]cP]SP__^X]c\T]cQhcWTV^eTa]\T]c)B_PX]24<0*
 ]^\X]PcX^]Qh cWT_Pa[XP\T]c RWP\QTab cWT V^eTa]\T]c P]S cWT_aTbXST]c P]S P_-
pointment by the parliament: Romania;
]^\X]PcX^]QhcWT_aTbXST]cP]S_Pa[XP\T]cP]SP__^X]c\T]cQhcWT_aTbXST]c)5aP]RT
4) Models involving civil society and/or relevant professional organisations: 
]^\X]PcX^]Qh^]T^abTeTaP[^UcWTU^[[^fX]VQ^SXTbTVRXeX[b^RXTch_^[XcXRP[_Pa-
ties, professional associations) and appointment by parliament and president: Bulgar-
ia, some German Länder, Hungary;
]^\X]PcX^]QhV^eTa]\T]cR^\\XccTTbP]SP__^X]c\T]cQh_aTbXST]c_Pa[XP\T]cP]S
professional organisations: Lithuania.
IX. Financial settings
The means of funding of NRAs represent the second key variable in my analysis and 
framed the second hypothesis of this study. Here, two aspects are crucial: the amount 
and the source of funding. Data indicate that the most common model of funding is di-
rectly from the state budgets (INDIREG, 2011). In some countries like Austria, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and Slovenia the budgets for regulators are supplemented by li-
cence fees, the revenues from technical fees or application fees, taxes on private broad-
casters’ income, donations and grants. The procedures of budget settings influence the 
degree of autonomy of regulators. I expect to see less institutional autonomy in cases 
where the budget of the regulatory authorities depends exclusively on the governments 
and where NRAs do not have “a maximum control of the input of resources on which they 
are dependent” (Baudrier, 2001). 
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X. Discussion and Conclusion
In this section I present some preliminary estimations regarding the potential for au-
tonomy of NRAs, with a detailed analysis of the two variables, appointment of heads 
and budget settings. Further research should be done to confirm my hypotheses. The 
study focuses on NRAs in 47 European countries. The innovation of this project consists 
in introducing new data on the appointment of heads of NRAs and budget frames, using 
these indicators to create a proxy for the autonomy of regulators. I assess the effects 
of legislative provisions on the independence of NRAs in different media systems, ac-
counting for such factors as the degree of independence of Central Banks, proportional 
representation and the number of veto players in the polity.
The first dimension to analyze is the potential of autonomy of NRAs measuring variables 
drawn from the literature (Fernandez-i-Marin, Saz-Carranza & Vandendriessche, 2012): 
the body responsible for the nomination and appointment, the mechanism of appoint-
ment, the possibility of vetoing the candidate, the length of the mandate, the possibility 
of renewal of the mandate, the dismissal procedures, the body or person with the power 
to dismiss and formal limitations of eligibility of candidates. According to my preliminary 
index of democracies, the Democratic Corporatist countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) tend towards consensus 
features of democracy: many political parties, broad coalitions, the practice of power 
sharing between parties, interest groups and cultural communities. In opposition, the 
Liberal systems (Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland) cluster majoritarian elements 
such as small numbers of political parties, domination of two broad, catchall parties, the 
existence of a unitary public interest. Mediterranean countries (France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain) have government-controlled systems that “leads to diminished cred-
ibility with audiences and sharp conflict between government and opposition” (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004). 
In countries such as Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the 
UK the appointing authority is the executive body (minister/government/council of minis-
ters). In other cases, the appointing authority is the parliament (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Portugal), socially relevant groups (Germany, Hungary) or a mix of parliament and 
the president (Italy, Spain, Romania, France) (INDIREG, 2011). The term of office of heads 
ranges between two and seven years and does not coincide with the election cycle, except 
for Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ser-
bia and Iceland. In Finland, Norway and Switzerland the general director has a permanent 
term of office. Specific rules for limiting the possibility of dismissal of NRAs heads ex-
ist in most of the European countries, excepting the case of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Sweden, Iceland and Luxembourg (INDIREG, 2011). The possibility for autonomy 
increases in cases where appointments last for a long time. The more frequent and easily 
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revoked heads’ appointments suggest the opposite (Gilardi, 2001). Considering Lijphart´s 
(1999) empirical evidence on the independence of Central Banks described in section III 
as an indicator for potential of autonomy of NRAs, I estimate that regulators in consensus 
democracies enjoy a higher rate of autonomy, while in majoritarian systems the potential 
for autonomy declines. In other words, due to the appointment procedures I rate the Dem-
ocratic Corporatist and the Liberal media systems with a higher degree of institutional 
autonomy. In opposition, the majoritarian Polarized Pluralist model is rated with a lower 
degree of institutional autonomy.
Recall from section III that the autonomy of NRAs is directly linked with the existence 
of Veto Players. Hanretty and Koop (2010) argue that where few Veto Players are in-
volved in appointment of NRAs’ heads “the closer the match between the ideal point of 
the appointing individual and that of the appointed person”; conversely, where multiple 
Veto Players need to reach consensus on appointments “the match between any appoint-
ing actor and the appointed person will be looser”. I question whether the autonomy of 
NRAs is influenced by veto players such as courts or special appeal bodies (ministries 
or governments) that can overturn regulator’s decisions (as in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Liechtenstein). 
In Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy special appeal bodies have 
powers to give instructions to NRAs. With few exceptions, decisions taken by the regu-
lators can be appealed to courts of law. In Estonia, Iceland (subject to certain excep-
tions), Germany there is no appeal procedure in place for the decisions taken by the 
regulator. In most of the European countries, courts do not have the power to replace 
the regulator´s decision with their own, but can cancel the decision and remit it back 
to the regulator. External appeal courts can replace regulators´ decisions in thirteen 
European countries: Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Norway and Swit-
zerland. From these preliminary findings I estimate that NRAs in consensus democra-
cies enjoy a higher degree of potential for autonomy due to the involvement of more 
veto players in appointment of heads. Contrary, the fewer veto players, the lower the 
rate of autonomy of regulators. 
The second dimension to analyze is the financial means of NRAs that represents a rel-
evant criterion for the autonomy potential. The most common model of funding the regu-
lators is directly from the state budgets. The government proposes and the parliament 
approves. In Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the UK, the budgets are 
only subject to the approval by government. I predict that NRAs in consensus democra-
cies have a higher degree of institutional autonomy due to the influence of proportional 
representation (PR) on budget settings, while NRAs in majoritarian democracies present 
a lower degree of institutional autonomy due to the influence of proportional represen-
tation (PR) on the budget. 
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The reflection of Proportional Representation (PR) on the financial autonomy can be hy-
pothesized based on Lijphart´s (1999) findings regarding the allocation of state budg-
ets. He demonstrates that the proportional allocation of public funds can be based “on 
the strenghts that the several segments have demonstrated in the PR elections”. Where 
external parties have legal influence on the budget, they may exert pressure to get po-
litically motivated decisions and to undermine NRAs’ operational capacity through inad-
equate financing. The greater the influence of a single player regarding the budget allo-
cation, the more likely it is to be used to punish or reward the body to generate politically 
motivated decisions (INDIREG, 2011). To sum up, considering Proportional Representa-
tion (PR) an indicator for the financial autonomy of NRAs, I rate the Democratic Corpo-
ratist and the Liberal media systems with a higher degree of institutional autonomy. In 
opposition, I predict a lower degree of institutional autonomy in the case of the Polar-
ized Pluralist model. 
Comparing the institutional design of NRAs in the European countries is representative 
taking into account the potential of diversity of the audiovisual framework. Provisory 
analysis of the data suggest that measuring the potential for autonomy of NRAs, based 
on the appointment of heads and the financial means can lead to a variety of outcomes. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section additional research should be done to con-
firm the working hypotheses, as estimations regarding the potential for autonomy of 
NRAs are preliminary. 
As stated, the core hypothesis of this study is the strong relationship between the de-
gree of autonomy of NRAs and countries corresponding with consensus and majoritarian 
features of democracy. To sum up, the objective of this research is to contribute to the 
debate on broadcasting regulation across Europe proposing measures for autonomy of 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). My aim is to fill the gap left in the debate on 
Hallin and Mancini´s (2004) paradigm of media models and Lijphart´s (1999) extension 
of democracy. Provisory analysis suggests that there is a strong correlation between the 
degree of autonomy of NRAs and features of democratic regimes. Triangulation of differ-
ent qualitative and quantitative methods indicate the differences between the various 
levels of autonomy of broadcasting regulators in Europe. Indexing regulatory authorities 
and their outcomes in decision-making processes add new dimensions for measuring the 
performance of government institutions. 
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